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Feminism and the Tournament
Jessica A. Clarke*
Introduction
Naomi Bishop, the protagonist of the 2016 film Equity, is the rare
"she-wolf of Wall Street."' At the beginning of the film, Bishop appears on
a panel at an alumni event. She explains her career choices to the young
women in the audience as follows:
I like money. I do. I like numbers. I like negotiating. I love a
challenge. Turning a no into a yes. But I really do like money. I like
knowing that I have it. I grew up in a house where there was never
enough. I was raised by a single mom with four kids. I took my first
job on Wall Street so I could put my little brothers through college.
But I am not going to sit here and tell you that I only do what I do to
take care of other people, because it is okay to do it for ourselves.
For how it makes us feel. Secure? Yeah. Powerful? Absolutely. I am
so glad that it's finally acceptable for women to talk about ambition
openly. But don't let money be a dirty word. We can like that too.2
The movie portrays its female characters as driven and disciplined, but
not any more scrupulous than the men. In Equity's vision of Wall Street, the
main difference between male and female bankers is the impossible
standard that the women are held to. Bishop learns early in the film that she
has hit the glass ceiling, with the only explanation being "the perception"
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to Neha Jain and
Naomi Schoenbaum for their excellent comments on dmft versions of this Essay.
1. Peter Travers, 'Equity' Review: The She-Wolf of Wall Street, ROLLING STONE (July 27,
2016) http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/reviews/equity-review-w430932
[https://perma.cc/98M9-2W45].
2. EQUITY (Sony Pictures Classics 2016).
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that she "rubbed some people the wrong way."3 The screenwriters heard
many versions of this story when doing research for the film. 4 Female
executives in Silicon Valley tell similar stories.s
Gender and the Tournament, by Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, and
Nancy Levit, offers a new account of the glass ceiling, connecting the
phenomenon with shoddy corporate governance and rising income
inequality in general.6 The Article criticizes the winner-take-all tournament
model for corporate advancement that has taken hold on Wall Street and in
Silicon Valley. This tournament resembles the sales competition from
David Mamet's Glengarry Glen Ross: "First prize is a Cadillac Eldorado.
Anybody wanna see second prize? Second prize is a set of steak knives.
Third prize is, you're fired."
Gender and the Tournament argues that this model of advancement is
"intrinsically gendered." It privileges traits traditionally associated with
men, such as aggressiveness, overconfidence, and narcissism.9 This
leadership mold not only disadvantages women, it also increases income
inequality. The winners keep winning, widening the gulf between the one
percent and everyone else.o And the tournament is bad for the economy as
a whole-encouraging employees to promote their own careers rather than
the good of the business." It incentivizes short-term gains at the expense of
long-term growth.12 Gender and the Tournament advocates for the use of
Title VII's disparate impact theory to challenge tournament-style
management practices that serve no business function and weed out
women.13 Professors Cahn, Carbone, and Levit's argument is compelling
and insightful, and their Article makes a valuable contribution to Title VII
scholarship.
3. Id. She was also told, "It's just not your year." Id.
4. Laura Jacobs, The Women of Wall Street: How Two Female Producers Got the Equity to
Make Equity, VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016) http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2016/07/equity-
women-wall-street-movie [perma.cc/AT3W-LK92] (reporting that the pmducers and screenwriter
stated that "the one story they heard over and over again was how women get to a certain level on
Wall Street, then are slowly (or not so slowly) pushed out").
5. Trae Vassalo et al., ELEPHANT IN THE VALLEY, https://www.elephantinthevalley.com/
[https://perma.cc/28CA-8UUD] (reporting the results of an informal survey taken in 2015 of 210
women in leadership roles in technology).
6. 96 TEXAs L. REv. 425, 425 (2017).
7. Glengarry Glen Ross (New Line Cinema 1992).
8. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 425.
9. Id. at 465-67.
10. Id. at 455.
11. Id. at 454.
12. Id. at 450.
13. Id. at 478.
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This Response asks some preliminary questions about he risks and
rewards of Gender and the Tournament's project for feminists. 14It
concludes that feminists should take seriously the Article's call for a
reinvigoration of disparate impact law-particularly considering the severe
limitations of other Title VII theories in promoting sex equality in the
workplace. Gender and the Tournament's purpose, however, is not just to
propose a legal theory.15 It also asks a broader audience to think more
critically about the connections between destructive competition, growing
income inequality, and women's disadvantage in the workforce. This
project may have rewards for feminists in linking sex equality with
progressive economic causes. It may complement work describing the ways
the corporate-tournament model perpetuates racial and other forms of
inequality.1 6
But Gender and the Tournament also poses risks for feminists. This
Response identifies two. First, the Article's critique of the new economy's
tournament mentality may lack appeal for those men and women who love
the competition and cannot envision a satisfactory way to restructure the
labor market. Second, the argument that toxic competition is intrinsically
gendered might be mistaken for the one that women are intrinsically
uninterested in (and no good at) competition. These are the very stereotypes
that justify women's lack of representation in high-earning occupations.
Gender and the Tournament's argument could inadvertently backfire for
those women who, like Naomi Bishop, want to compete in the tournament
but find their efforts undermined by double standards. This Response
therefore urges feminists not to give up on challenging the double
standards, double binds, and sex stereotypes that confront ambitious
women, in addition to the new legal strategies suggested by Gender and the
Tournament.
I. Potential Rewards
Gender and the Tournament joins a growing chorus of legal scholars
and social scientists frustrated by the ineffectiveness of Title VII in
14. By feminist, I mean a project that seeks to advance sex equality. There are a wide variety
of feminist legal theories. See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY To
TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006). But for my purposes, a simple definition will suffice.
15. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 485 (discussing how "innovations in governing law prompt
social and educational changes much larger than their doctrinal effects").
16. See, e.g., id. at 481-82 (discussing how certain corporate ranking systems may have
racially disparate effects); David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 61 (1998) (arguing for legal reform to give employers incentives to reduce
racial inequality by "restructuring compensation, job assignments, and career pathways to provide
equal opportunities for pmfessional achievement o all employees").
44 [Vol. 96:42
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accomplishing social change.1 7 The Article highlights an important nuance:
since 1990, the pay gap between men and women has increased the most at
the upper end of the economy. While CEO compensation has increased
almost 1,000% since the 1970s, women are only four percent of CEOs of
Fortune 500 companies.1 9 In lower wage jobs, men's wages are leveling
down to come closer to women's because of the decline in traditionally
male manufacturing jobs. 20 The point is not to disregard the persistence of
discrimination against women at the bottom end of the income spectrum but
to inquire into why the disparities at the top are so stark and what might be
done about it.21
Title VII allows for two main types of sex discrimination claims:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.22 Disparate treatment claims
allege that a worker was treated differently because of his or her sex.23
Disparate impact claims allege that an employer practice, such as a
promotional test, screens out a disproportionate percentage of women and is
not justified by a business necessity.24 Disparate treatment claims require a
showing of discriminatory motive, while disparate impact claims do not.25
Disparate treatment claims predominate in Title VII litigation, while
disparate impact claims are quite rare. Almost all disparate treatment
claims are brought by a single plaintiff.27 This is unfortunate because there
is success in numbers. Plaintiffs do better in cases alleging systemic
patterns.28
Individual disparate treatment claims have severe limitations. As
Gender and the Tournament highlights, some courts have narrowly
construed the doctrine to require that every plaintiff produce a
17. ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: How WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 269 (2017); LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS,
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 216 (2016); TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION
LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY LAW 151 (2017); SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: How
AMERICA'S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 177 (2017).
18. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 455.
19. Id. at 456.
20. Id. at 455.
21. These authors cannot be accused of inattention to class, a topic they have written on
extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The End of Men or the Rebirth of
Class?, 93 B.U. L. REV. 871, 871 (2013).
22. Int'lBhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
23. Id.
24. Id. Men might bring these claims too. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside
Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004).
25. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
26. BERREY, supra note 17, at 54, 47 (in a study of 1,788 cases from 1988 to 2003, finding
that only four percent of cases involved claims of disparate impact).
27. Id. at 58 (finding that ninety-three percent of disparate treatment cases were brought by a
single individual).
28. Id. at 270.
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"comparator": meaning, for example, that if a woman is claiming sex
discrimination, she must point to a man in a comparable job who received
preferential treatment.29 This type of evidence is difficult to find in the
many workplaces in which every employee serves a unique function, and
no two jobs are easily comparable.30
There are other limitations as well. Many employers are savvy enough
not to admit to bias.31 Even when they do, courts "personaliz[e]"
discrimination, characterizing it as the actions of rogue employees for
which the employer should not be penalized.32 In litigation, individual cases
become referenda on the plaintiffs job performance, not interrogations of
sexism.3 3 Employers have every incentive to vilify plaintiffs-scrutinizing
their job performances and characterizing them as malingering.3 4 Juries
accept the story that plaintiffs are villains because it is consistent with their
deeply-held beliefs about the meritocracy of the American economy. 5 Race
and sex stereotypes taint the judicial process. 36 Judges defer to "symbolic"
compliance with civil rights law, letting employers off the hook for having
nondiscrimination policies, even if those policies are ineffective.3 7 Federal
courts have invented a number of special, complex doctrines to dismiss
employment discrimination cases at summary judgment.38 In light of the
bruising nature of litigation for plaintiffs, the poor odds of success, and the
fact that recoveries are generally modest, women have little incentive to sue
in the first place.3 9 When plaintiffs do prevail, they typically agree to
confidential settlements, blunting the potential for their lawsuits to bring
about broader changes to the workplace.40
29. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 439 (citing Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745-46 (2011)).
30. Id. at 439-40, 475. The need for comparator evidence should not be overstated. See Joan
C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD": Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1311, 1349-50 (2008) (arguing that "the trend in Title VII law is away from courts looking for
comparator evidence," and pointing to examples in the sex-stereotyping case law).
31. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 476; but see BERREY, supra note 17, at xiii (arguing that overt
biases remain drivers of workplace inequality).
32. GREEN, supra note 17, at 48.
33. BERREY, supra note 17, at 192-95.
34. Id.
35. Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1275, 1304-11 (2012).
36. BERREY, supra note 17, at 229-43.
37. EDELMAN, supra note 17, at 168-215 (offering empirical evidence of this phenomenon,
with attention to individual disparate treatment cases).
38. One book devotes four chapters to these doctrines, arguing they are not supported by Title
VII's text or purpose. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 17, at 15-123.




Gender and the Tournament argues that disparate impact law might
have more promise. It draws on Mary Anne Case's work advocating for a
new type of stereotyping claim: one that "question[s] the stereotypical
gendered characteristics of the job rather than of individual applicants for
it." 41 Case offered the example of policing. Selection processes for many
police forces have focused on traditionally masculine qualities-like upper-
body strength and aggressiveness.42 These processes not only tend to
exclude women, but also produce poor police forces by underestimating the
value of qualities that can de-escalate conflicts-like interpersonal and
communication skills.43
Gender and the Tournament applies this framework to industries like
finance and technology. It argues that selection and promotion processes
that focus on traditionally masculine leadership traits-greed, narcissism,
and ruthlessness-are not only likely to exclude women, but also lead to
destructive forms of competition that are bad for business." It offers the
example of ongoing litigation in Moussouris v. Microsoft Corporation, a
case challenging Microsoft's "stack ranking" system that graded employees
on a mandatory curve.45 The plaintiffs alleged that stack ranking
disproportionately harmed female engineers while not serving any
legitimate business interest.4 After the case was brought, Microsoft
abandoned stack ranking.47
Gender and the Tournament's critique of the business utility of
practices like stack ranking is useful as a legal argument. Ranking systems
resemble the sorts of employment tests that yield easily understandable data
and have traditionally lead to successful disparate impact claims.4 8
Moreover, one reason courts have curtailed disparate impact doctrine is that
judges are reticent to disrupt routine and established business practices.49
This is why disparate impact challenges to "routine work hours, most leave
polices, and mandatory overtime" have failed.5 0  Gender and the
Tournament demonstrates that some practices that disadvantage women are
41. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 86 (1995).
42. Id. at 88-94.
43. Id.
44. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 483.
45. Id. at 427.
46. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 5-6, Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15-cv-
01483-JLR (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2015), http://microsoftgendercase.com/wp-
content/uploads/microsoft amendedcomplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9G9-YVAW]
47. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 427.
48. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
716 (2006).




aberrant, harsh, and inefficient. It thus severs the presumed link between
gender inequality and efficiency.
On a political level, disparate impact is, in many ways, a beautiful
argument. Much resistance to civil rights law stems from zero-sum
thinking-the idea that the inclusion of women comes at the expense of
men. But sometimes, women are the proverbial miner's canaries; their
distress signals that the air in the mine is poisonous for everyone.51 That
stack ranking hurt women was a signal that it was bad for all employees and
the business: harming productivity, destroying teamwork, and encouraging
employees to undermine one another. Remedies for disparate impact
violations emphasize injunctive relief to end the offending practice rather
than individual monetary awards.52 Thus, disparate impact law can benefit
all workers by putting an end to odious practices. Because it has no intent
requirement, an allegation of disparate impact may not sound like an
accusation of misogyny. It may therefore be less likely to put the accused
on the defensive and be more conducive to a problem-solving mindset.53
Even without litigation, evidence that systems like stack ranking harm
diversity efforts and are generally poor management practices may prompt
corporate change from within.
II. Potential Risks
While Gender and the Tournament's disparate impact argument holds
potential for advancing sex equality, its critique of the corporate tournament
also holds peril. It risks being misunderstood as linking feminism with
critiques of all forms of competition. It could have the unintended
consequence of backfiring for women who want to compete on the same
terms as men.
A. Can Feminists Hold Tournaments?
For feminists, there's a political risk to calling toxic competition in the
new economy "intrinsically gendered." By "gendered," the authors seem to
mean masculine, not that the competitors are always men. 54 The authors are
not offering an essentialist concept of sex. Women can be masculine too.55
Nor are they offering an essentialist concept of gender. Gender and the
Tournament takes aim at a particular type of destructive machismo prized in
51. Cf. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 274-83 (2002).
52. See generally Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L.
REv. 1357, 1391 (2017).
53. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 484-89 (2001).
54. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 431 n.25.
55. Id. at 486-87 (criticizing former Hewlett Packard CEO Carly Fiorina).
48 [Vol. 96:42
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the new economy." It does not argue that the meanings of femininity and
masculinity are fixed or that femininity is necessarily superior to
masculinity. As all viewers of reality television know-destructive
competition can be culturally coded as feminine as well as masculine.7
If the Article might be critiqued for offering a reductive vision of
anything, it is competition. While the authors are most critical of "negative -
sum" practices like stack ranking and "winner-take-all" systems for
executive compensation, they also criticize pressure to work longer hours,
the external market for executives, increasing variability in compensation,
stock options, short-term targets, tying pay to share value, merit-based
bonuses, performance pay, monetary incentives, and subjective
evaluations.8 It is a strength of the Article that it offers such a detailed
depiction of competition in the new economy, but also a weakness, as the
Article might be misinterpreted as disparaging all forms of workplace
competition.59 Disparate impact law generally requires that plaintiffs point
to the specific employment practices causing the adverse impact on
women. What aspects of the tournament are toxic? What aspects are
gendered? In the workplace, some competitive structures may give
employees the ability to set expectations and work toward goals.6 ' Title VII
even provides a defense to disparate impact liability for merit or
production-based compensation schemes.62
On a political level, this project risks linking feminism with critiques
of competition writ large. Another obvious lesson from reality television is
63that Americans love competition, especially the winner-take-all variety.
56. Id. at 448-55.
57. See, e.g., MEAN GIRLs (Paramount Pictures 2004) (depicting stereotypical forms of
feminine competition).
58. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 448-54. The article argues, for example, that both reductionist
measures for physician compensation (i.e., based on procedures billed) and subjective ones lead to
gender disparities. Id. at 451 n.134.
59. But see id. at 480 n.340 (noting that there may be some types of businesses in which an
emphasis on selfish competition is justified).
60. See, e.g., Martin v. Coinmach Corp., No. 15-CV-8137 (AJN)(SN), 2016 WL 6996182, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016) (holding that, even though their is an exception in Title VII for
employment practices that cannot be sepamted for analysis, it did not apply to the various
components of that employer's compensation system).
61. Economists have long made arguments about the efficiency of tournament structures in
employee compensation. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments
as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 841 (1981).
62. Compare McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 876-77 (7th Cir. 2012)
(interpreting Section 703(h)'s exception for bona fide merit or production systems to bar disparate
impact challenge to a bonus scheme for securities brokers based on objective production targets),
with Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 253
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a merit system is not bona fide if it "does not measure what it purports
to measure" because it is not job-related).
63. See, e.g., Survivor (CBS 2000 to present); cf. Eyer, supra note 36, at 1304 (discussing the
American commitment to the ideology of meritocracy). My argument is not that there is
2018] 49
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Many people will be skeptical of a political project that seeks to abolish a
wide swath of competitive practices. Critics will ask, can feminists still hold
tournaments after this critique? What would a feminist tournament look
like? Would there be winners and losers or just awards for participation?
Of course, there must be some middle ground between participation
awards and the Hunger Games of the new economy.64 The authors seem to
have an alternative model of the workplace in mind: one from mid-century,
in which employees stayed with the same employer for their entire
careers.6 5 This system created incentives for corporations to invest in their
people and vice versa.6 Careers progressed along established ladders until
67retirement. But the old economy was hardly feminist. As the authors
61
recognize, the model only worked for a segment of white men. Whether it
would work in the information age, in which many workers value their
mobility, is another debate.69
For Gender and the Tournament's project to persuade as cultural
criticism, it requires a new vision of competition in the workplace that is
both plausible and equitable. The project suggests there is promise in
approaches to leadership that are more "[s]tereotypically female" in
"tak[ing] group cohesion into account" rather than maintaining exclusive
"focus . . . on the bottom line."70 Are there virtues in "stereotypical male"
leadership approaches as well? How might we restructure employment
opportunities to feature the best of both, while not confining any particular
men or women to either stereotype?
something inherent in American culture that dictates a preference for competition. The
competitive structure of the U.S. labor market likely shapes Americans' hopes and dreams. But it
does not follow that those preferences can easily be changed by restructuring labor markets.
64. See generally SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES (2008) (dystopian young adult
novel about teenagers fighting to the death in a televised tournament). Another analogy might be a
"game of thrones." See Game of Thrones: You Win or You Die (HBO television broadcast May 9,
2011) (fantasy drama about dynastic conflict for control of a fictional continent, in which a lead
female character explains, "When you play the game of thrones, you win or you die.").
65. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 447-48; see also id. at 487 (proposing "longer term horizons"
and "reciprocal notions of loyalty" between employers and employees).
66. Id. at 447-48.
67. Id. at 445.
68. Id. at 447-48 n.109.
69. See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 9 (2013) (discussing empirical support for Nobel Laureate
Kenneth Arrow's theory that "ideas travel with workers as they move between companies, thereby
spreading knowledge and strengthening economies"). Moreover, problems like overwork cannot
be addressed by discrimination law alone; labor standards and tax incentives pose barriers to
change. See Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced Workweek in the United
States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN AND THE NEW EcoNoMY: THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL
NORMS 131 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006).
70. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 471.
50 [Vol. 96:42
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B. What About Alpha Females?
Gender and the Tournament attacks the ways that jobs are gendered.
But people are gendered too. Women (and men) are unfairly stereotyped.
Another risk of re-envisioning sex discrimination law to critique the
tournament is that it offers no assistance to those women who want to
compete in stereotypically masculine ways, but are held to a different set of
rules. In doing so, it runs the risk of being misunderstood as a project that
associates women with the very stereotypically female traits that are used to
justify their exclusion from workplace opportunities.
Women's underrepresentation in leadership has long been explained as
a result of women's own choices to turn away from workplace ambition and
72focus instead on domesticity, social relationships, and cooperation. As
Vicki Shultz has argued, this "lack of interest" argument presumes that
workers form their preferences outside of the labor market, due to causes
such as biology and early-childhood socialization.73 Courts accept the "lack
of interest" argument to absolve employers of responsibility for sex-
segregated and sex-stratified workforces.74 But empirical research
demonstrates workers' preferences are not fixed at birth or in childhood;
rather, they change in response to experiences and opportunities in the labor
market.75 For example, women who see little opportunity for advancement
in a job tend to lower their sights and change their aspirations.6 Men who
imagine that sex segregation is natural "adopt proprietary attitudes toward
'their' jobs."77 These men may harass female intruders to undermine their
success, which then justifies the belief that women were not capable in the
71. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 1093-
96 (2017) (discussing six decades of research on stereotypes and biases in the workplace);
Williams & Bornstein, supra note 30, at 1326-35 (discussing sex stereotypes affecting working
mothers and fathers).
72. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1800-04 (1990) (analyzing Title VII sex discrimination cases in which
employers raised a "lack of interest" argument to explain women's absence from high-pressure
white-collar occupations). The "lack of interest" argument continues to influence judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 357 (2011) (holding that a Title
VII class-action on behalf of female Wal-Mart employees nationwide lacked common questions
because, among other reasons, "[s]ome managers will claim that the availability of women, or
qualified women, or interested women, in their stores' area does not mirror the national or
regional statistics").
73. Schultz, supra note 72, at 1816-24.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1816-39 (discussing empirical evidence from large-scale quantitative studies of
women's changing occupations and career preferences, as well as qualitative research on female
Marines and women employed in blue-collar trades).
76. Id. at 1827-32 (discussing, among other works, ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977)).
77. Id. at 1832.
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first place. Women may be denied the mentoring, networking,
sponsorship, and support opportunities that enabled the success of their
male colleagues.7 9 These practices deter women from seeking high-level
jobs, lending credence to the belief that women were never interested in
those jobs anyway.so
Gender and the Tournament offers evidence to support Schultz's
account of the ways in which employers shape workers' preferences in
high-end occupations in the new economy. It argues that women's
underrepresentation results from a series of "cascade effects."
Organizations may explicitly define leadership positions "in stereotypical
male terms" that discourage women from applying.8 2 By characterizing
positions as hyper-competitive, employers "are also signaling that they will
tolerate certain types of behavior that may disadvantage women, such as in-
group favoritism or lack of mentoring."83 In industries that require rule-
breaking and risk-taking, women are more likely than men to be penalized
for those very behaviors. Realizing that the game is "heads I win, tails you
lose," women do not play. 5 This account could be helpful, not just to
plaintiffs bringing disparate impact claims, but also to those crafting
systemic disparate treatment challenges to workplaces with stark patterns of
sex segregation.6 It might also be a starting point in efforts to explain why
members of certain racial groups are excluded from opportunities in the
technology industry and in examining the complicated intersections
between race- and sex-based marginalization.7
78. Id. at 1833-35.
79. DEBORAH RHODE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 64-65 (2016) (discussing evidence of the
"old boy's network" and emphasizing that "[d]ifferences across race and ethnicity can compound
the problem").
80. Schultz, supra note 72, at 1836-39.
81. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 465.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 464.
84. Id. at 469.
85. Id. at 470.
86. On a systemic dispamte treatment theory, plaintiffs may use statistical analysis of an
employer's workforce to argue that the employer engaged in a "pattern or practice" of intentional
discrimination. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-39 (1977). Unlike a
disparate impact claim, this theory does not require that the plaintiffs point to any particular
employer policy. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 153-55 (discussing advantages of systemic
disparate treatment claims). However, some research suggests plaintiffs have more success when
they bring both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. See Selmi, supra note
49, at 735, 740 (analyzing 301 reported federal court decisions). Systemic disparate treatment
claims are more likely to succeed when plaintiffs are able to "craft a stoiy, a narrative, that
explains how stereotyping has, in fact, affected the defendants' workplace." Michael Selmi,
Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 477, 505-07 (2011). In this regard, Gender and the Tournament may be helpful to
advocates in thinking through the narratives that might apply to particular workplaces.
87. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, DIVERSITY IN HIGH
TECH 2 (May 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/hightech/upload/diversity-in-
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But Gender and the Tournament also offers other explanations for the
lack of women at the top of the new economy. Primarily, it argues that the
new economy prizes "narcissistic traits" in leaders, perhaps even
psychopathy." This disadvantages women, because "the selection for
narcissistic traits favors men, who are more likely than women to desire
power; to be attracted to positions that promise money, status, and
authority; to be willing to demand greater rewards for themselves; and to
use greater status to exploit others."89 The authors point to social science
evidence showing population-level sex differences with respect to
narcissistic traits.90 But Gender and the Tournament does not tell a story to
explain this particular sex difference.91
Instead, Gender and the Tournament emphasizes that it makes no
business sense to promote narcissists. At this point, however, it is not clear
what normative work the sex discrimination argument can do. 92 Of course
there is something wrong with a competitive mindset in which the winners
believe they are better types of humans than the losers. 9 If the basic moral
and business cases against this leadership model have failed to convince, it
seems unlikely that the disparate impact one will do the trick.94
high-tech-report.pdf [https://perma.cclPL85-5EYT] (reporting data on the lack of representation of
African American and Hispanic workers in the technology sector, particularly in executive roles).
88. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 466-67 & 467 n.234.
89. Id. at 466-67. The Article also argues that men are "identified with" these traits, which
could be a claim about stereotypes mther than one about sex differences. Id. at 466.
90. Id. (discussing Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Diferences in Narcissism: A Meta-analytic
Review, 141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 264 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038231
[https://perma.ccl59ZV-925X]).
91. The research it relies on, however, theorizes a complicated explanation based in the
dynamic intemctions of labor markets, biology, and socialization. See Grijalva et al., supra note
90, at 263; id. at 283. Part of the story may be that women are less narcissistic because they are
more likely to be penalized for it, while men are more likely to be rewarded. Id. at 263-64.
92. Courts may refuse to question the business necessity of a qualification standard if they are
persuaded that the disparity is explained by women's own choices not to pursue money, status,
and authority. In disparate impact cases, courts justify physical selection procedures that have an
indisputable disparate impact on women on the ground that women could pass those tests only if
they trained hard enough. Yiyang Wu, Scaling the Wall and Running the Mile: The Role of
Physical-Selection Procedures in the Disparate Impact Narrative, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1216
(2012) (discussing this "failure to train" reasoning).
93. This Essay focuses on the risks to feminism in linking gender to the critique of the
tournament. But there is a risk that the critique of the tournament may suffer from an alliance with
feminism as well. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against he Universal Turn in
Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1243-45 (2011) (discussing how framing a policy as a
solution to discrimination can result in "identity politics" backlash and polarization).
94. Disparate impact theory can be a hard sell in general. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 49, at
782 (explaining that "disparate impact" appears to "redefine our concept of discrimination to
focus on unequal results," but "[a]s we know from our lengthy battle over affirmative action, there
is no widespread public support for defining equality or discrimination in terms of results or
achievements"). But see Zatz, supra note 52, at 1359 (arguing that dispamte impact law ensures
that an employee's opportunities are not unfairly limited by her race or gender).
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There are other reasons to be skeptical of the upside of this legal
argument. The authors do not explain how plaintiffs in a disparate impact
case might challenge hiring criteria such as "energy, dominance, self-
confidence, and charisma."95 Such criteria are likely to be listed among
many others as part of a subjective standard for choosing executives. While
courts have held that subjective employment practices may be challenged
through disparate impact law,96 so few cases have succeeded on this theory
that one empirical study described the litigation risk it poses as "vanishingly
small."97 Moreover, "failure to hire" claims are particularly rare, due in part
to the difficulty of finding accurate data about the applicant pool in the
relevant labor market.98 The higher up the job, the smaller the qualified
labor market and the less likely that a plaintiff will be able to find an
adequate sample size to support a disparate impact claim.99 Additionally,
courts have traditionally shown deference to subjective selection processes
in upper level jobs.1 00 One reason is their reluctance to intervene in business
decisions that they consider beyond their ken."o0 Another is the concern that
employers will respond by implementing hiring quotas.102
As a general matter, disparate impact arguments carry the risk of
perpetuating stereotypes by presenting statistical evidence of sex
differences.103 In political discourse, distinctions between feminism,
femininity, and women are slippery.' 4 There are unique risks in linking
feminist arguments with critiques of certain personality traits. Many people
regard personality as hard-wired.o While the authors are not making
95. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 466.
96. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
97. Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for
Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 434-35
(2012) (assessing cases from 2005 to 2011).
98. Id. at 460-61.
99. Cf. Selmi, supra note 49, at 741-42 & n.157 (discussing the small sample size problem
generally).
100. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV.
945, 976-77 (1982); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1163, 1193-94 (1988).
101. Bartholet, supra note 100, at 962.
102. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 53, at 486.
103. See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
759, 776-83 (2013) (discussing how disparate impact challenges to policies that are not family
friendly may "broadcast" the stereotype that women are less committed to work, inducing more
discrimination on the basis of that generalization).
104. Gender and the Tournament might invite this confusion, for example, by referring to
"the importance of what women do well" rather than "[s]tereotypically female leadership styles."
Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 471 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., Walter Mischel, Toward an Integrative Science of the Person, 55 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing "our intuitions-and theories-about the invariance and
stability of personality" and "the equally compelling empirical evidence for the variability of the
person's behavior across diverse situations").
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claims about women's inherent natures or tendencies, evidence of sex
differences in personality might be mischaracterized as support for the old
story that women form their preferences for less money, status, and
authority outside, rather than inside, the workplace.106
Moreover, the argument that studies show fewer women display
narcissistic traits than men may easily be mistaken for a claim that women
are morally superior to men. Claims of women's moral superiority appear
to be inconsistent with demands for equality and are easy targets for the
opposition. Arguments about women's moral superiority have a long and
troubled history.0 7 A "tacit condition" of these arguments has been the
double standard: if women are morally superior, they will be held to a
higher standard than men.10s
My point is not to oppose the important claim advanced by Gender
and the Tournament. Rather, it is to urge that any disparate impact
argument be accompanied by continued criticism of double standards and
gender stereotypes. Yet Gender and the Tournament offers no
encouragement to female bankers in the mold of the fictional Naomi
Bishop, who display the same narcissistic traits as male bankers but are held
to a double standard.109 The Article discusses the real-life Ellen Pao, the
Silicon Valley venture capitalist who lost her high-profile sex
discrimination trial against her former firm, Kleiner Perkins.11 o Pao "very
much wanted to be" in the high-stakes world of venture capital, but she was
penalized for deploying "the same self-interested, competitive behavior as
the men.". Thus, the authors conclude, Pao's "case simply amounts to a
106. The authors acknowledge research suggesting organizations may influence the extent to
which sex differences are manifested. See Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 471 n.258 ("Women, in
contmst, tend to be genemlly less tolerant of illegal or unethical behavior, though woman
managers in institutions in which such behavior is normalized exhibit fewer differences than other
workers.") (citing ALICE H. EAGLY & LINDA L. CARLI, THROUGH THE LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH
ABOUT How WOMEN BECOME LEADERS 46 (2007)).
107. Nancy F. Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-
1850, 4 SIGNS 219, 220-21, 233 (1978) (discussing the Victorian-em view that women were
sexually "passionless" and that this was the "cornerstone" of their "moral superiority"); DEBORAH
L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 14 (1989) (discussing
claims of female moral superiority by suffragists).
108. Cf. Cott, supra note 107, at 227 (explaining that the "tacit condition" of claims of that
"women under God's grace were more pure than men" was that clergy "expected not merely the
souls but the bodies of women to corroborate that claim").
109. My point is not that women's preferences for cut-throat competition should be honored
or celebrated. Their preferences may very well be adaptive. In other wonis, if they had other
options, perhaps many women (and men) would prefer more coopemtive business structures. My
point is that women who end up in cut-throat competitions should not be held to a double
standard.
110. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 473-78.
111. Id. at 477. Today, Pao expresses ambivalence about the competitive norms of venture
capital. See Ellen Pao, This Is How Sexism Works in Silicon Valley: My Lawsuit Failed. Others
Won 't, CUT (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/08/ellen-pao-silicon-valley-sexism-
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claim that Kleiner Perkins should welcome women with sharp elbows
alongside the men."1 12 In bringing this claim, they argue, Pao "could not
truly represent the women who never applied because they found the entire
environment hostile."113 She could not put forth "the most compelling
claim": that "the system itself is intrinsically flawed."114
Rather than debating which claim is most compelling, feminists might
see utility in both disparate treatment and disparate impact arguments and
explore how these theories might be complementary. Success for alpha-
female plaintiffs would not achieve all the authors' aims for Title VII,
which include the return of middle-class jobs and stable economic
growth.115 But such cases might achieve some measure of sex equality by
challenging double standards and the classic double bind for professional
women: "out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do
not."116
For all its flaws, disparate treatment law is not futile.11 7 While Pao did
not prevail at trial, she did spur discussion about the glass ceiling in Silicon
Valley." Employment lawyers interviewed after the case reported an
increase in the number of women voicing concerns about discrimination,
pursuing informal complaints, and entering into confidential settlements
with their employers.11 9 The integration of these women in the upper ranks
reset-excerpt.html [https://perma.cc/TB6W-NQL3] (describing her job at Kleiner Perkins as
"thrilling" but noting an "underbelly of competitiveness").
112. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 473.
113. Id. at 478.
114. Id. Although Gender and the Tournament does not make this argument, one could
imagine a sort of white-washing objection: that the integration of a critical mass of women into
the upper echelons of the new economy would legitimate hypercompetitive workplaces by making
them appear to be fair and inclusive. Cf. HESTER EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM SEDUCED: How GLOBAL
ELITES USE WOMEN'S LABOR AND IDEAS TO EXPLOIT THE WORLD 16 (2009) (arguing that
Americans accept "widespread unemployment and other dislocations for the sake of a chance at
the American dream by winning the lottery or emulating Jennifer Lopez"). And yet,
hypercompetitive workplaces already enjoy legitimacy, whether despite or because of the small
number of women who have managed to succeed in them.
115. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 486 (arguing that 'Ji]t is not a solution to simply to add
women to the upper echelons of corporations without changing the backdrop template of
evaluation.").
116. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
117. Pao's case was hardly a slam-dunk for Kleiner Perkins; another plaintiff with similar
facts and a different jury might have succeeded. Cahn et al., supra note 6, at 477 (discussing
disagreement among the jurors).
118. See, e.g., Sue Decker, A Fish Is the Last to Discover Water: Impressions From the Ellen
Pao Trial, RECODE (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.recode.net/2015/3/26/11560742/a-fish-is-the-
last-to-discover-water-impressions-from-the-ellen-pao [https://perma.cc/27A9-X23W]
(commentary by former Yahoo president calling the Pao trial a "wake-up call" "[r]egardless of
how the verdict comes out").
119. Vivian Giang, Silicon Valley Attorneys: Already Seeing a Pao Effect,' FORTUNE (Apr.
8, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/04/08/silicon-valley-pao-effect/ [perma.cc/K8P6-6756].
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may have spillover effects by challenging stereotypes about women,120
loosening the grips of all-male networks,121  or undermining the
counterproductive dynamics of tokenization.122 The Pao trial inspired
female executives in Silicon Valley to share their personal experiences of
discrimination and demand corporate change.123 Years after the trial, the
media continues to cover sexism in Silicon Valley.124 Even when women do
not bring lawsuits, their public accounts of discrimination can prompt
changes in corporate leadership.1 25 While the ultimate results of these
efforts remain to be seen, there are examples of productive organizational
transformation in the Title VII literature.126
Conclusion
Gender and the Tournament envisions Title VIl's project as the pursuit
of race and sex equality alongside broader income equality and national
prosperity. But what if Title VII litigation might achieve some measure of
sex or race equality but not move the needle on income quality or national
prosperity? To return to the story that began this Essay, should feminists
root for Naomi Bishop in her effort to shatter the glass ceiling? The timing
of the movie Equity's release, coinciding with the 2016 presidential
120. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1063, 1109-10 (2006) (discussing social
science evidence on "debiasing agents" "individual[s] with characteristics that run counter to the
attitudes and/or the stereotypes associated with the category to which [they] belong[]" and the
conditions under which their presence reduces discrimination); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki
Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the
Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 648
(2004).
121. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender
Spillovers in Corporate Leadership, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 635, 635 (2011) (finding an increase in
the number of women in senior management after the addition of women to corporate boards).
122. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 79, at 120-21.
123. See, e.g., VASSALO ET AL., supra note 5.
124. See, e.g., Liza Mundy, Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women?, ATLANTIC (Apr.
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awful-to-
women/517788/ [https://perma.cc/JGV4-KRTT]; Katie Benner, Women in Tech Speak Frankly on
Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMEs (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/
technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-harassment.html [perma.cc/C9TA-9N29].
125. See Nitasha Tiku, Why Aren 't More Employees Suing Uber?, WIRED (June 23, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/uber-susan-fowler-travis-kalanick-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/
C3U7-DSWX] (observing that many Uber employees are bared from suing the corporation by
mandatory arbitration agreements, but former Uber employee Susan Fowler's online account of
sex discrimination prompted an internal investigation that may have led to the resignation of Uber
CEO Travis Kalanick).
126. See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 71, at 1098-1102 (discussing research on a variety of
effective employer interventions to reduce bias); Sturm, supra note 53, at 489-520 (describing
programs at Deloitte & Touche, Intel Corporation, and Home Depot to demonstrate that
"effective, legitimate, and accountable processes can emerge" although there is no "one-size-fits-
all model").
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campaign, was not coincidental.127 While the producers may have had
Hillary Clinton in mind, the more apt comparison is GOP candidate Carly
Fiorina, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard. Gender and the Tournament
criticizes Fiorina for self-interested behavior and corporate malfeasance.128
During the campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump criticized Fiorina for a
different reason. Trump said, "Look at that face! Would anyone vote for
that? Can you imagine that, the face of our next president?!"129 Trump later
denied his comment had anything to do with Fiorina's appearance. When
Fiorina was asked her response in a GOP primary debate, she looked
straight into the camera and stated: "I[W]omen all over this country heard
very clearly what Mr. Trump said."130 Fiorina may never have been my
choice for president, but in that moment, I was rooting for her.
127. See Jacobs, supra note 4.
128. Cahn et al., supra note 7, at 486-87.
129. Paul Solotaroff, Trump Seriously: On the Trail With the GOP's Tough Guy, ROLLING
STONE (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/trump-seriously-20150909
[perma.cc/VN36-QTP4] (emphasis in original).
130. Carly Fiorina, CEO of Hewlett-Packani, et al., CNN Reagan Library Debate (Sept. 16,
2015) (transcript available at http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/09/16/cnn-reagan-library-
debate-later-debate-full-transcript/ [https://perma.cclYJM5-WEQG]).
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